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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates whether percentage of ownership controlled by the directors of companies has any 
association with types of dividend declared by them. Based on the data for the years 2006 to 2009 from the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange, this paper found that most of the companies provided stock dividends rather than cash dividends. 
Using Yate’s Continuity Correction Chi-square Test, this study has found existence of a significant relationship 
between the percentage control of ownership and types of dividend declared. Furthermore, the study indicates that 
the companies having ≥50% share controlled by the directors are 3 times more likely to offer stock dividends than 
companies having <50% control of the shares by the directors. Whereas, the companies having ≥50% control of 
ownership by the directors are less likely to offer cash dividends compared with <50% control of the shares by the 
directors. 
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INTRODUCTION                                                                     
hareholders are the owners of every corporation. 
However, every share holder is not concerned to 
voice out their opinion regarding the policies passed 
in AGM. They feel that their voices are insignificant 
related to the voting power of the directors who mostly 
hold a significant portion of the stocks. Thus, the 
corporate decision regarding to pay stock dividend or 
cash dividend is primarily made by the Board of Directors 
(BoD) in their board meeting and most of the time the 
other small share holders unanimously agreed upon the 
decision in the annual general meeting (AGM). The 
question then arises whether cash or stock dividend 
benefits more to the majority shareholders, namely the 
BoDs of the corporation. This issue is important to the 
investors in general for making their investment decision 
so as to maximize their wealth. Furthermore, it is also 
relevant with the problem of agency cost involved for the 
firms, as the directors are not only the decision makers 
whether or not to provide any dividend by the firms but 
also are direct beneficiary of the applied dividend 
strategy. 
A stock dividend implies an increase in nominal share 
capital and hence a decrease in retained earnings. Firms 
announcing stock dividends finance growth entirely by 
debt (explaining the need for an increase in nominal share 
capital) and retained earnings. The shareholder can keep 
the shares and hope that the company will be able to use 
the money not paid out in as cash dividend to earn a better 
rate of return, or the shareholder could also sell some of 
the new shares to create his or her own cash dividend. The 
biggest benefit of a stock dividend is that shareholders do 
not generally have to pay taxes on the value. Taxes do 
need to be paid, however, if a stock dividend has a cash-
dividend option, even if the shares are kept instead of the 
cash. The idea about the relevance of dividend on the 
value creation of a company goes back to Modigliani and 
Miller’s (1961) dividend irrelevancy hypothesis, who 
argued that dividend policy has no effect on either the 
price of a firm’s stock or its cost of capital. In a perfect 
world, the dividend policy is irrelevant to shareholders 
wealth. This proposition has laid solid theoretical 
foundation for the dividend policy, which at later stage, 
the economists have offered explanations in different 
ways about dividend payment, such as effect of taxes, 
dividend signaling, agency cost issues and transaction 
cost. 
The idea that ownership structures whether or not affect 
the modes of dividend payment is one of the important 
fields of study in capital market around the globe. Studies 
done by various researchers on both the developed and 
developing capital market found interesting results.  
Louis T. W. Cheng, Hung-Gay Fung & T. Y. Leung (2006), 
found that in many emerging financial markets, firms 
typically pay stock dividends rather than cash dividends. 
Since the opening up of Chinese capital markets during 
the early 90’s, it has been found that Chinese investors 
S 
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appear to favor stock dividend over cash dividends. There 
are many hypotheses explaining why firms pay out stock 
dividends. The signaling and retained earnings 
hypotheses, which are closely linked and relate stock 
dividends to a firm’s good growth or investment 
potential, appear to be the leading contenders in 
explaining stock dividend policies of firms in the U.S. 
(Baker et al, 1995). 
Thus, it is important to analyze correlation between the 
directors’ control of the shares and the modes of dividend 
payment by the firms. It may suggest trading strategy that 
can be devised based on the nature of the relationship. For 
this, we have chosen an emerging market in Asia, namely 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). An extensive search of 
literatures also justifies the need to do because there is a 
dearth study on this market on the subject matter. 
 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this paper is to examine existing 
relationship between ownership structure and modes of 
dividend payment, while it will also try to find out 
industrywise dividend payment for the years 2006-2009. 
Specifically, the paper is going to examine whether the 
percentage of directors’ ownership has an impact on the 
dividend declaration of companies under different 
industries. If any, what types of dividend (equity or cash) 
is relevant with the majority (or minority) ownership 
shareholders. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Qiao, Y. and Chen, Y. (2001) found evidence of positive 
statistical relationship between dividends and mix 
dividend policies of firms in Chinese stock markets. Their 
study showed that the market was not sensitive with cash 
dividends but was reactive to stock dividends. On the other 
hand, Chen, Wei et al (1999) Empirically analyzed the 
dividend policy of different companies listed in Shanghai 
Stock Exchange by method of Cumulated Abnormal 
Return (CAR) and studied the existence and character of 
the signaling effect of dividend policy. The study found 
different degrees of CARs resulted from different dividend 
policies. The CARs of right issues were higher than that of 
cash dividend but lower than that of the bonus issues. 
Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) found a strong positive 
relation between dividend changes and a firm’s ability to 
generate future earnings and cash. Authors showed that 
dividend loses its information content in explaining firm’s 
future performance when earning and earning related 
variables (such as earnings forecast) are released 
simultaneously. A new view is the tunneling perspective, 
which argues that cash dividends may be used as a tool to 
re-direct firm resources to benefit large shareholders and 
top management at the expense of minority shareholders. 
A number of studies explore the reason for and the impact 
of issuing stock dividends. Proposals to explain stock 
dividends include the signaling, trading range, liquidity, 
cash substitution, and retained earnings hypotheses. Foster 
and Vickrey (1978) reported that stock dividend generates 
positive abnormal returns on the declaration date rather 
than on the ex-date and that size is not a determinant of 
market reaction, supporting a signaling function of stock 
dividends. Authors report significant abnormal returns 
around the announcement of stock dividends, suggesting 
that stock dividend issue is a signal for future cash 
dividends, cash flows, and earnings. In an examination of 
responses from chief financial officers, Eisemann and 
Moses (1978) found them supporting for signaling, 
liquidity, cash substitution, or retained earnings 
hypotheses. Whereas, Baker and Philips (1995) reported 
evidence from a managers’ survey supporting signaling 
and retained earning hypotheses. 
Cash dividends and stock dividends have been argued 
substitutes for one another. As discounting a dividend 
payment would likely produce a negative market 
reaction, firms usually issue stock dividends rather than 
paying out cash dividends that might lead to a cash 
shortage for internal use. Ghosh and Woolridge (1985) 
found that issue of stock dividends can mitigate the 
negative market reaction due to reduction or omission of 
cash dividends, which provides evidence for the cash 
substitution hypothesis. Fung and Leung (2001) proved 
that reinvestment by plowing back earnings should be 
viewed positively; as it indicates profitable opportunities 
in firms. If firms indeed have good investment prospects, 
shareholders prefer stock dividends in order to preserve 
cash for investments; seasoned equity financing is not 
readily available for future funding needs because of 
regulatory constraints in China. Thus, the 
underdevelopment of China’s financial market implies 
that rational Chinese stockholders would generally prefer 
stock dividends to cash dividends, supporting the 
retained earning hypothesis. Huang and Fung (2004) 
found that if dividend policy serves as a signal to the 
market, firms’ values (prices) will change as a result. Price 
appreciation will not translate into financial gains for the 
controlling stockholders whose shares cannot be traded 
through the stock exchanges. Thus, they would prefer 
cash dividend to realize an immediate financial gain. 
Mitton (2002) found no significant association between 
insider ownership and stock price performance for a 
sample of East-Asian companies. Furthermore, studies 
regarding the association between insider ownership and 
managerial misbehavior are found to have mixed results. 
Recent studies on the relationship between dividend 
policy and level of ownership by the directors include 
Wang (2006), Lee J. (2006) and Andres, C. (2008). Wang 
provided evidence that family ownership is associated 
with higher earning quality, a finding consistent with the 
alignment effect of family ownership. Jim Lee (2006) 
studied on S&P and fortune 500 companies where a 
comparison based on net profit margin, employment, 
revenue and gross income growth were made between 
1992-2000 and found that average profit margin for family 
firms was 10%, two points higher than non-family owned 
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firms. German researcher Andres, C. (2008), analyzed on 
275 German public companies and found that companies 
with significant family ownership are more positively and 
outperform their peers with other type of shareholders. 
METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the relationship between the ownership 
structure and the types of dividend payment by various 
companies, study years have been considered from 2006 to 
2009. For this paper we have selected data on dividend 
payout by firms under different industries listed on Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE). Survey years 2006 to 2009 have been 
selected because during these years many companies offered 
both cash and stock dividends for their shareholders and the 
related data have been collected from the official website of 
DSE (www.dsebd.org). A total of 193 samples have been 
selected from four different industries, namely, banks, 
insurance, cement, and pharmaceutical. Purpose sampling 
technique has been followed in this regard. The companies 
which declared either stock or cash dividends only are 
selected and companies which declared both stock and cash 
dividends are excluded from the sample of this study. The 
paper divided the firms into two main categories based on 
the control of the ownership by the directors of the 
companies. On one segment, there are companies with 
greater than or equal to 50% ownership controlled by the 
directors and on the other are the companies with less than 
50% control of shares by the directors. Seventy one 
companies have been included in the survey having greater 
than or equal to 50% ownership by the directors whereas, 
122 companies with ownership control of less than 50% by 
the directors.  
The study begins with descriptive analysis of dividend 
payments by the four different types of industries for the 
study periods. Besides, the paper will also analyze 
whether the types of dividend declared has any 
association with the amount of control by the director 
shareholders for the selected sample. To analyze it the 
following hypotheses have been proposed: 
H0: There is no significant association between ownership 
structure and types of dividend payment. 
H1: There is a significant association between ownership 
structure and types of dividend payment. 
Chi-square ( x
2
) test will be used to determine the 
significance of the association, if there is any. The greater 
the value of x
2
, the greater would be the discrepancy 
between observed and expected frequencies. The formula 
for computing chi-square is: 
 



E
EO
x
2
2
  
Where, O = observed frequency. 
  E = expected or theoretical frequency. 
The calculated value of x
2
is compared with the 
tabulated value of x
2
 for given degrees of freedom at 
specified level of significance. If the calculated value of 
x
2
 is greater than the tabulated value, the difference 
between theory and observation is considered to be 
significant, i.e., it could not have arisen due to fluctuations 
of simple sampling. On the other hand, if the calculated 
value of x
2
 is less than the table value, the difference 
between theory and observation is not considered 
significant, i.e., it could have arisen due to fluctuations of 
sampling. Logistic regression has also been used where 
ownership structure is considered as the independent 
variable and modes of dividend payment as the 
dependent variable.  
FINDINGS 
Table 1 describes the weighted average returns classified 
under the stock and cash dividends for the years 2006-2009 
for the four selected industries. It shows that except for the 
year 2006, all the banks either provided stock dividends or a 
combination of both cash and stock since the firms which 
provided both types of dividends are excluded from our 
sample. During the year 2006 most of the banks provided 
stock dividends rather than cash dividends. With the 
exception of the year 2009, insurance companies provided 
mostly stock dividends where as cement and pharmaceutical 
industries provided mostly cash dividends. The reason for 
this could be primarily attributed to implementation of 
BASEL II, which made it obligatory that every commercial 
bank, insurance companies and other non-bank financial 
institutions have to increase the equity participation by 
issuing right/bonus shares for its shareholders and not 
primarily relying on the debt capital. 
 
Table 1: Average Dividends of the Sample Companies for 
the Years 2006-2009 (%) 
 
Source: Study result 
Table 2 and 3 explain the average returns for both 
directors controlled firms (50% or more controlled by the 
directors) and the general investors controlled firms (less 
than 50% controlled by the directors) and associated 
average dividends as stock and cash dividend. They show 
an interesting result. We find that higher percentage of 
stock dividends were declared for banks where the 
majority shares are controlled by the directors for the year 
2007. But, for the year 2006, 2008 and 2009 companies with 
directors holding minority shares provided higher 
percentage of dividend. For insurance companies we find 
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very similar dividend rates irrespective of the percentage 
control by the directors of the firms. For cement industry, 
cash dividends were mainly declared and the higher 
percentage of dividends went to the companies with 
primarily under the directors’ control. However, 
pharmaceutical industry declares mainly cash dividends, 
where companies with less than 50% controlled by the 
shareholders during the years 2006, 2007 and 2009. 
Nevertheless, it has been changed during 2008 when a 
little larger dividend was declared for the favor of 
directors’ controlled shares. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Average Dividends for ≥50% & 
<50% Control of Ownership by Directors in 2006 & 2007. 
 
Source: Study result 
 
Table 3: Comparison of Average Dividends for ≥50% & 
<50% Control of Ownership by Directors in 2008 & 2009 
 
Source: Study result 
 
Table 4 shows that out of the 193 sample companies for the 
four years a total of 135 companies provided only stock 
dividends where as 58 companies provided only cash 
dividends. Whereas, a total of 91 companies having <50% 
ownership control by the directors offered stock dividend 
and 31 companies offered cash dividends. The same 
tendency has been observed in case of ≥50% control of 
ownership. In such case 44 companies declared stock 
dividend and 27 companies declared cash dividend. 
 
Table 4: Four years average ownership structure and 
dividend category 
Ownership  
Structure 
Stock  
Dividend 
Cash  
Dividend 
Total 
<50% 91 31 122 
≥50% 44 27 71 
Total 135 58 193 
Source: Study result 
 
Furthermore, to analyze the relationship between types of 
dividend declared and the ownership structure; a Yate’s 
Continuity Correction chi square test was carried out 
since the number of degree of freedom is 1 and SPSS 
software has been used. The results of the Yate’s 
Continuity Correction chi square test are shown in Table 
5. It shows a significant relationship between types of 
dividend payment and the ownership structure at ρ = 10% 
level. Therefore, it can be concluded that the directors’ 
control of ownership has significant association with the 
types of dividend paid, whether stock or cash. 
 
Table 5: Results of Yate’s Continuity Correction Chi-
Square Test 
 Value df 
Continuity Correction 2.826 1 
   
No. of Valid Cases 193    
Source: Study result 
 
For a better understanding of the relationship a logistic 
regression has been run. The results of the logistic 
regression have been presented in Tables 6 & 7. Where, 
<50% ownership controlled by directors is indicated as 0 
(zero) and ≥50% ownership controlled by directors is 
indicated as 1 (one). Table 6 indicates that companies 
having ≥50% control of ownership by directors are less 
likely to offer cash dividends than stock dividends 
compared with <50 ownership controlled by the directors. 
Table 7 indicates that companies having ≥50% share 
controlled by the directors are about 3 times more likely 
to offer stock dividends than companies having <50% 
control of the shares by the directors. 
 
Table 6: Results of Logistic Regression  
Ownership Controlled 
by Directors B Sig. 
Exp(B)/Odd
s ratio  
<50% 
≥50% 
-1.077 .000 
1.000 
0.341 
Source: Study result 
 
Table 7: Results of Logistic Regression  
Ownership Controlled  
by the Directors B Sig. Exp(B) 
<50% 
≥50% 
1.077 .000 
1.000 
2.935 
Source: Study result 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has tried to investigate the relationship 
between director’s control of ownership and modes of 
dividend payment. It found that, in general, most of the 
industries would like to provide stock dividend rather 
than cash dividend. Using Yate’s Continuity Correction 
Chi-Square, this study has found existence of a significant 
relationship between the percentage control of ownership 
and types of dividend declared. Furthermore, the study 
indicates that companies having ≥50% control of 
ownership by directors are less likely to offer cash 
dividends than stock dividends compared with <50 
ownership controlled by the directors. Whereas, the 
companies having ≥50% share controlled by the directors 
are about 3 times more likely to offer stock dividends than 
companies having <50% control of the shares by the 
directors. This provides an intriguing thought on the 
matter of agency relationship. Whether or not the interests 
of the general investors are protected by the types of 
dividend declared is a matter of further study using 
longer time series data.  
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